

CONTENTS

WHY IS IT THAT RED POLITICAL POWER CAN EXIST IN CHINA? (October 5, 1928)	11
I. The Internal Political Situation	11
II. Reasons for the Emergence and Survival of Red Political Power in China	12
III. The Independent Regime in the Hunan-Kiangsi Border Area and the August Defeat	15
IV. The Role of the Independent Regime of the Hunan-Kiangsi Border Area in Hunan, Hupeh and Kiangsi	16
V. Economic Problems	17
VI. The Problem of Military Bases	18
THE STRUGGLE IN THE CHINGKANG MOUNTAINS (November 25, 1928)	21
The Independent Regime in the Hunan-Kiangsi Border Area and the August Defeat	21
The Current Situation in the Area Under the Independent Regime	27
Military Questions	28
Land Questions	35
Questions of Political Power	38
Questions of Party Organization	40
The Question of the Character of the Revolution	45
The Question of the Location of Our Independent Regime	47
ON CORRECTING MISTAKEN IDEAS IN THE PARTY (December 1929)	53
On the Purely Military Viewpoint	53
On Ultra-Democracy	56
On the Disregard of Organizational Discipline	57
On Absolute Equalitarianism	58
On Subjectivism	59
On Individualism	60
On the Ideology of Roving Rebel Bands	62
On the Remnants of Putschism	62
A SINGLE SPARK CAN START A PRAIRIE FIRE (January 5, 1930)	65

PROBLEMS OF STRATEGY IN CHINA'S REVOLUTIONARY WAR

(December 1936)

77

Chapter I

How to Study War

77

1. The Laws of War Are Developmental 77
2. The Aim of War Is to Eliminate War 80
3. Strategy Is the Study of the Laws of a War Situation as a Whole 81
4. The Important Thing Is to Be Good at Learning 84

Chapter II

The Chinese Communist Party and China's Revolutionary War 89

Chapter III

Characteristics of China's Revolutionary War

92

1. The Importance of the Subject 92
2. What Are the Characteristics of China's Revolutionary War? 94
3. Our Strategy and Tactics Ensuing from These Characteristics 97

Chapter IV

"Encirclement and Suppression" and Counter-Campaigns Against

It — the Main Pattern of China's Civil War

98

Chapter V

The Strategic Defensive

103

1. Active and Passive Defence 103
2. Preparations for Combating "Encirclement and Suppression" Campaigns 106
3. Strategic Retreat 109
4. Strategic Counter-Offensive 121
5. Starting the Counter-Offensive 123
6. Concentration of Troops 131
7. Mobile Warfare 137
8. War of Quick Decision 142
9. War of Annihilation 146

PROBLEMS OF STRATEGY IN GUERRILLA WAR AGAINST JAPAN

(May 1938)

153

Chapter I

Why Raise the Question of Strategy in Guerrilla War?

153

Chapter II

The Basic Principle of War Is to Preserve Oneself and Destroy the Enemy

155

Chapter III

Six Specific Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan 156

Chapter IV

Initiative, Flexibility and Planning in Conducting Offensives Within the Defensive, Battles of Quick Decision Within Protracted War, and Exterior-Line Operations Within Interior-Line Operations

157

Chapter V

Co-ordination with Regular Warfare	165
------------------------------------	-----

Chapter VI

The Establishment of Base Areas	167
---------------------------------	-----

1. The Types of Base Areas	168
2. Guerrilla Zones and Base Areas	170
3. Conditions for Establishing Base Areas	172
4. The Consolidation and Expansion of Base Areas	174
5. Forms in Which We and the Enemy Encircle One Another	175

Chapter VII

The Strategic Defensive and the Strategic Offensive in Guerrilla War	176
--	-----

1. The Strategic Defensive in Guerrilla War	177
2. The Strategic Offensive in Guerrilla War	179

Chapter VIII

Development of Guerrilla War into Mobile War	181
--	-----

Chapter IX

The Relationship of Command	183
-----------------------------	-----

ON PROTRACTED WAR (<i>May 1938</i>)	187
---------------------------------------	-----

Statement of the Problem	187
--------------------------	-----

The Basis of the Problem	195
--------------------------	-----

Refutation of the Theory of National Subjugation	198
--	-----

Compromise or Resistance? Corruption or Progress?	202
---	-----

The Theory of National Subjugation Is Wrong and So Is the Theory of Quick Victory	206
---	-----

Why a Protracted War?	208
-----------------------	-----

The Three Stages of the Protracted War	210
--	-----

A War of Jig-Saw Pattern	219
--------------------------	-----

Fighting for Perpetual Peace	222
------------------------------	-----

Man's Dynamic Role in War	225
---------------------------	-----

War and Politics	226
------------------	-----

Political Mobilization for the War of Resistance	228
--	-----

The Object of War	229
-------------------	-----

Offence Within Defence, Quick Decisions Within a Protracted War, Exterior Lines Within Interior Lines	231
---	-----

Initiative, Flexibility and Planning	235
--------------------------------------	-----

Mobile Warfare, Guerrilla Warfare and Positional Warfare	244
--	-----

War of Attrition and War of Annihilation	248
--	-----

The Possibilities of Exploiting the Enemy's Mistakes	252
--	-----

The Question of Decisive Engagements in the Anti-Japanese War	254
---	-----

The Army and the People Are the Foundation of Victory	257
---	-----

Conclusions	262
-------------	-----

PROBLEMS OF WAR AND STRATEGY (<i>November 6, 1938</i>)	269
I. China's Characteristics and Revolutionary War	269
II. The War History of the Kuomintang	273
III. The War History of the Chinese Communist Party	275
IV. Changes in the Party's Military Strategy in the Civil War and the National War	277
V. The Strategic Role of Guerrilla Warfare Against Japan	279
VI. Pay Great Attention to the Study of Military Matters	282
CONCLUSIONS ON THE REPULSE OF THE SECOND ANTI-COMMUNIST ONSLAUGHT (<i>May 8, 1941</i>)	287
THE TURNING POINT IN WORLD WAR II (<i>October 12, 1942</i>)	295
ON COALITION GOVERNMENT (TWO EXCERPTS, "THE PEOPLE'S WAR", "THE PEOPLE'S ARMY") (<i>April 24, 1945</i>)	301
ON PRODUCTION BY THE ARMY FOR ITS OWN SUPPORT AND ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THE GREAT MOVEMENTS FOR RECTIFICATION AND FOR PRODUCTION (<i>April 27, 1945</i>)	309
CONCENTRATE A SUPERIOR FORCE TO DESTROY THE ENEMY FORCES ONE BY ONE (<i>September 16, 1946</i>)	315
A THREE MONTHS' SUMMARY (<i>October 1, 1946</i>)	321
THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE NORTHWEST WAR THEATRE (<i>April 15, 1947</i>)	327
STRATEGY FOR THE SECOND YEAR OF THE WAR OF LIBERATION (<i>September 1, 1947</i>)	329
MANIFESTO OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY (<i>October 1947</i>)	335
ON THE REISSUE OF THE THREE MAIN RULES OF DISCIPLINE AND THE EIGHT POINTS FOR ATTENTION — INSTRUCTION OF THE GENERAL HEADQUARTERS OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY (<i>October 10, 1947</i>)	343
THE PRESENT SITUATION AND OUR TASKS (SECTIONS I, II, III) (<i>December 25, 1947</i>)	345
THE DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT IN THE ARMY (<i>January 30, 1948</i>)	353
ON THE GREAT VICTORY IN THE NORTHWEST AND ON THE NEW TYPE OF IDEOLOGICAL EDUCATION MOVEMENT IN THE LIBERATION ARMY (<i>March 7, 1948</i>)	355
THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE LIAOHSI-SHENYANG CAMPAIGN (<i>September and October 1948</i>)	363
THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE HUAI-HAI CAMPAIGN (<i>October 11, 1948</i>)	369

THE MOMENTOUS CHANGE IN CHINA'S MILITARY SITUATION (November 14, 1948)	373
THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE PEIPING-TIENTSIN CAMPAIGN (December 11, 1948)	377
CARRY THE REVOLUTION THROUGH TO THE END (December 30, 1948)	383
TURN THE ARMY INTO A WORKING FORCE (February 8, 1949)	393
ORDER TO THE ARMY FOR THE COUNTRY-WIDE ADVANCE (April 21, 1949)	397
PROCLAMATION OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY (April 25, 1949)	407