

## CONTENTS

CHAP.	PAGE
INTRODUCTION . . . . .	viii
I GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS . . . . .	I
<p>A résumé of the state of the war at the time the raid was planned. A description of the port of St. Nazaire and its uses by the enemy. The Normandie Dock and the U-boat base. The objects to be attacked in order of importance.</p>	
II THE PLAN . . . . .	13
<p>Intelligence available and details of the enemy defences. Forces selected for the attack and absence of previous Naval preparations. Details of the original plan and alterations. Additional forces asked for.</p>	
III PREPARATIONS . . . . .	26
<p>Alterations to ships and craft. The design of the explosive charge. Assembly of force at Falmouth. Security arrangements and cover-plan. Difficulty of last-minute training.</p>	
IV THE ATTACK . . . . .	39
<p>The outward passage. The approach. The action from the time of opening fire till rendezvous with <i>Atherstone</i> and <i>Tynedale</i>. The success of H.M.S. <i>Campbeltown</i>. Brief mention of Commandos landing and failure to land at the Old Mole.</p>	
V THE COMMANDOS' ATTACK . . . . .	60
<p>Full description of the attack on shore, giving details of successes achieved in demolition work.</p>	
VI THE WITHDRAWAL . . . . .	73
<p>And passage home with short comment on effectiveness of air bombardment and air cover on passage.</p>	

CHAP.		PAGE
VII	THE RESULTS . . . . .	82
	The German version and effectiveness of their propaganda. Account of damage done. Effects of delayed explosion of <i>Campbeltown</i> . Details of damage done and remarkable efforts made by the Germans to effect repairs. Losses on our side and summary of casualties.	
VIII	SOME CONCLUSIONS . . . . .	96
	Mistakes made and conclusions drawn.	

## APPENDIXES

I	STATISTICS : TIDE AND DARKNESS . . . . .	105
II	TRAINING PROGRAMME . . . . .	106
III	LIST OF NAVAL AND MILITARY PERSONNEL FORMING THE RAIDING PARTY . . . . .	107